

STAT

Page Denied

STAT

SUMMARY OF ROMANIAN WORKERS PARTY JOURNAL, MARCH 1956Editorial

The editorial in the March 1956 issue of *Lupta de Clasa*, monthly theoretical and political organ of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers Party, is entitled "The Creative Character of Marxist-Leninist Science" (pages 3-19).

The editorial lists as proof of this Marxist-Leninist characteristic the new solutions to fundamental theoretical problems devised by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in such matters as the form of transition from capitalism to socialism, the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, and the possibility of avoiding wars at the present time. The novelty of the new theses, which deny the necessity of civil war for the triumph of socialism in a country and affirm the possibility of peaceful coexistence of nations with different social systems, somewhat blunted, however, by the editorial's statement that Lenin had already predicted this.

Speaking of the noninevitability of war, the editorial declares that Lenin's theory about the inevitability of war was right, insofar as the economic basis for war continues to exist so long as imperialism exists; but the moral and material strength of the socialist world of today is so great, the editorial asserts, that "it is able to defeat the aggressive plans of the imperialists," with the help, it is true, of powerful groups of workers within the imperialist countries themselves. In the controversy as to whether a war, if it did break out all the same, would end with the destruction of both camps or only of the capitalist world, the editorial sides with those who hold the latter view.

Turning then to a discussion of the diverse roads to socialism, the editorial suitably castigates the cult of personality and its corollary, dogmatism, but carefully avoids mentioning any names. The editorial blames dogmatism for the inadequate way in which social scientists have studied certain specific peculiarities, said to have appeared in Rumania and in other People's Democracies as a result of special conditions arising after World War II. Thus, it says, many economists have failed to show that in Rumania under the "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry," the workers allied with the peasants did actually collaborate with part of the bourgeoisie. Then follows the somewhat cryptic statement that "some formulas and theses worked out decades ago and under different circumstances are not applicable to present conditions in Rumania," possibly an allusion to the thesis of inevitable intensification of class war before the final victory of socialism.

The editorial criticizes historians and philosophers for neglecting to study the role of the masses in Rumanian developments over the last 10 years, a gap which was filled only by the "profoundly scientific analysis" made by the Second Party Congress of the Rumanian Workers Party. It was the popular masses, the editorial asserts, which played the decisive part in the victorious people's insurrection of 23 August 1944, a fact which has been insufficiently brought out by historians. The historians are also accused of failing to marshal the available evidence to show that the same was true of Rumanian developments up to 6 March 1945, as was proved by the mass demonstrations, the struggle for the seizure of local government offices, and the realization of the agrarian reform by revolutionary methods.

Finally, workers in the ideological field are taken to task by the editorial for neglecting the role played by the worker-peasant alliance in the socialist seizure of power. Socialist transformation of agriculture in Rumania has, according to the editorial, certain special characteristics, flowing from the manner in which agriculture developed in bourgeois-landlord Rumania and the nature of the struggle against the landlords. Then follows another cryptic statement to the

STAT

effect that "a careful study of this complex process and theoretical generalizations will undoubtedly help in the collectivization of agriculture, the task set by the Second Party Congress. Some propagandists . . . failed to analyze thoroughly the actual processes going on in the villages, in order to understand the meaning and the direction of peasant evolution under the people's democratic regime, and the effect of objective laws."

Strangely enough the publication of a series of monographs dealing with these developments in Rumania in 1944 and 1945 which are reviewed in the same issue of Lupta de Clase, is not mentioned by the editorial. (See below, "Review of Chronicle of Transition Period.")

As a matter of fact, the editorial continues, no scientific, economic, or historical activity is possible without careful study of statistical data and of actual phenomena, followed by theoretical generalizations. Unfortunately, the editorial writes, intellectuals all too often treat their subjects superficially and steer away from the peculiarities in Rumania's evolution toward socialism. The ideological work of propagandists, professors of social sciences, and social scientists of the Academy of the Rumanian People's Republic has been focused too loosely on the practical tasks of socialist construction. The Marxist thesis that philosophers must not only interpret, but also transform the world, is particularly topical today, according to the editorial, and ideological cadres must never forget they are not simply "ideological archivists, but active militants for the diffusion of advanced experience. It is characteristic for the vitality of Marxism-Leninism that one or the other of its facets be exposed, depending upon the concrete historic tasks of the moment. At present, its economic teachings and the study of concrete economic facts have priority."

But the editorial is forced to concede that most Rumanian propagandists have a hard time with economic problems and facts, and fail to synthesize the experience of industry, of collective farms, and of farm associations. The cult of personality is blamed for the prevalent fear of responsibility; for the tendency of propagandists to let others solve their problems, although they themselves are most competent to deal scientifically with the processes of social development; and for the extreme rarity of the appearance in theoretical periodicals of "articles" in which are brought up for discussion courageous theses springing from materialist dialectical analyses of reality. The editorial points an accusing finger at the editorial offices which "were afraid" (quotes in the original) of an exchange of views based on Marxist-Leninist ideas. A few timid attempts were given up very soon.

The Lupta de Clase editorial gives the targets of the foregoing criticism one clue as to its meaning: They are told that the proceedings of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will help them greatly to translate into fact the decisions of the Second Rumanian Party Congress. They are assured that a close analysis of the manner in which the "people's democratic" regime was installed, and of the established tasks to raise living standards, etc., is of particular importance in the light of developments at the Soviet congress. The proceedings of the Rumanian congress will facilitate the study of the transformation of Rumania "from a semicolon of foreign capitalism into a sovereign and independent country in the process of building socialism." Rumanian activists on the ideological front, the editorial concludes, are in duty bound to follow the "shining example" of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and "to give a new impulse to Marxist-Leninist creative thought in the analysis of the grandiose historic process through which the Rumanian people are passing."

STAT

Judging from the fact that the presence of the Red Army in Rumania from 1944 onward is nowhere mentioned in the editorial, which however repeatedly refers to the green light given by the Soviet party congress to the rewriting of history, one may gather that the purport of the editorial is to invite Rumanian Communist historians to reformulate the history of the August 1944-March 1945 period, high-lighting the domestic "facet" of the Communist seizure of power. They are given a hint at the same time that they need not bother about objective truth. It may now be permitted to rewrite history, but that does not mean that the writer may forget he is "a militant activist for the diffusion of advanced experience," and not just an "ideological activist."

However, the editorial gives no indication what connection there is between events in 1944-1945, in whatever manner they are presented, and the implementation of the decisions of the Second Party Congress with regard to the collectivization of agriculture and greater industrial efficiency.

Formation of the Communist State

"Some Formation and Development Problems of the Rumanian People's Democratic State" by I. Ceterchi (pages 34-48) gives the latest authoritative Communist version of events in Rumania in 1944 and 1945 and a summary of the present-day functions of the state in a People's Democracy.

As, according to the Communist version, on 23 August 1944 the "patriotic guards organized by the party" simply "took advantage of the victorious advance into Rumania of the Soviet Army" to "arrest the fascist government" and "to seize the chief administrative offices," and as this was "the only possible way, under the circumstances, to overthrow the fascist dictatorship from the inside [in italics in the original]," the seizure of power does not seem to have been much of a problem, neither does the author describe it as such. However, the next step, consisting of the "establishment of a real, new, and people's democracy" is explicitly termed a problem by the author, inasmuch as the "reactionary forces aimed at re-establishing their power, that is the bourgeois-landlord dictatorship, after 23 August," but on 6 March 1945 lost the decisive battle against the "masses, led by the party."

The real problem for the Communist historian, which the author does not mention but with the solution of which he is apparently concerned, is how to make it appear that the Communists overthrew the Antonescu regime and withdrew from the war on 23 August 1944, while being unable to claim that they were in control before 6 March 1945, when Vyshinskiy presented his ultimatum, backed by Soviet tanks, to the King.

This incident is naturally not mentioned by the author, who credits "the popular masses, led by the party" with the eviction of the Radescu government, followed by a "qualitative change" in the ruling class wielding the state power. The author claims the merit of "originality" for the way the "people" seized power in Rumania, without civil war, thanks mainly to the broad democratic front the Communist party was able to organize, and which included, besides the peasants, a group representing part of the liberal bourgeoisie. "The peaceful progress of the revolution", the author continues, "was helped also by the presence on Rumanian soil at the time of the Soviet Army, which, without interfering in the country's internal affairs, paralyzed, by its mere presence, the activities of the reactionary forces."

STAT

The regime in power after 6 March 1945 is described as a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship, led by the proletariat, although it was not a "Socialist-type" regime. Its first task, successfully fulfilled, according to the author, was to overcome the obstacles raised in its path by the representatives in the government of the liberal bourgeoisie, as well as by reactionary plots; to carry out economic reforms, to re-establish Rumania's complete independence, and to establish the broadest democratic rights and freedoms; free speech, a free press, freedom of association, perfect equality, universal, direct, and equal suffrage etc.

A very interesting peculiarity of the Rumanian People's Democracy in this first stage of its evolution, says the author, was the monarchic form of government which continued to subsist. But, the author explains, the parliament elected in 1946, really represented the popular will; and after all, says the article, what really matters, is not the form, but the substance, and that was the hegemony of the workers, allied with the peasants. The popular masses soon became convinced that capitalism was a hindrance to the country's progress.

In November 1947, according to the author, the people eliminated the last representatives of the bourgeoisie in the government, and on 30 December 1947, abolished the monarchy. The second stage, also achieved by governmental fiat without revolution, and which began in 1948, was a form of dictatorship of the proletariat.

Summing up the history of the 1944-1947 period, the author describes it as a "unique revolutionary process of creation and consolidation of the socialist state. The people's democratic power in the first stage prepared the ground for the socialist revolution which expropriated the expropriators." This, the author claims, shows that, "under the conditions created by a change in world power relationships in favor of socialism," peaceful achievement of a socialist revolution was perfectly feasible in Rumania, as in other People's Democracies.

The rest of the article is a recapitulation of the well-known Communist aims, which in Rumania in the second stage of people's democracy, can be briefly described as the creation of the economic basis of Communism. But, the author claims, the Rumanian people already enjoy "the enormous advantages flowing from the wise economic planning which has superseded capitalist anarchy," although, he admits, the picture is slightly marred by some bureaucratic defects, chiefly the lack of concrete studies on the needs of the national economy and on the industrial resources available to satisfy them.

Undeterred by this admission, the author goes on to state that "the organizing role of the state is steadily growing in agriculture" in which its "economic-organizational role is much more complex"; it consists in achieving the socialization of agriculture by persuasion only.

Aside from the interesting admission by the mouthpiece of the Rumanian Workers Party that one of the potentially valuable features of socialism, purposeful planning, is based, in Rumania at any rate, on mere assumptions as to the needs and resources of the national economy, the chief interest of the article seems to lie in the apparent attempt to devise a new formula for the history of the 23 August 1944-6 March 1945 period. Whereas up to the demotion of Stalin, a large share of the credit for the Communization of Rumania was always given to the USSR and the Red Army, in the last few months articles have appeared in authoritative publications in which they were not even mentioned in this connection. The present article, in which action by the Rumanian Communist Party is described as decisive and the presence of the Soviet Army is mentioned merely as a helpful factor, appears to be an attempt to find a middle way

STAT

between the two extremes. However, the Red Army obviously remains a somewhat embarrassing problem, for it mars the otherwise perfect picture of Rumania as a typical proof of the correctness of Khrushchev's thesis, according to which nonviolent seizure of power by parliamentary means is perfectly possible. Obviously, now that greater elbow room has been allowed Communist historians since the demotion of Stalin, the role to be assigned to the Soviet forces in the creation of the Rumanian People's Republic must be raising even more serious problems for the Rumanian Communist leaders; for they are caught between the Scylla of the unpopularity of foreign intervention and the Charybdis of indispensable pro-Soviet propaganda.

Review of Chronicle of Transition Period

This issue of Lupta de Clasa further reviews, intentionally or by coincidence, a chronicle of events in Rumania in the critical period from 23 August 1944 to 6 March 1945.

The recent publication of the Party History Institute, Din Lupta P.C.R. Pentru Incheierea Aliantei Clasei Muncitoare cu Taranimea Muncitoare in Batalia Pentru Reforma Agrara din 1944-1945. Studii si Referate Monografice (Some Episodes of the Struggle of the Rumanian Communist Party for the Formation of the Alliance Between Workers and Peasants in the Battle for the 1944-1945 Agrarian Reform), Vol I, Bucharest, 1955, 301 pages (reviewed on pages 110-115), is a collection of monographs describing events in a number of towns and communes between 23 August 1944 and 6 March 1945, that is, during the period extending from the armistice to the imposition of a virtually Communist government by the Soviets. The reviewer, N. Cretu, considers the book "a valuable contribution to the study of the historic period during which the popular revolution began in our country and the alliance between workers and peasants was formed ... under the hegemony of the workers." However, he points out, although it is perfectly true that the masses play the decisive role in the making of history, they do nevertheless create their own heroes, and he considers the authors' failure to mention them decidedly unfair.

An even more serious fault of the book, Cretu thinks, is the absence of theoretical generalizations, most of the monographs being content with an enumeration of dates and happenings. Cretu feels, however, that Marxist-Leninist historiography demands, a scientific treatment of events, on a high theoretical plane.

Finally, the reviewer criticizes the authors of the monographs for having given the impression that the worker-peasant alliance developed exclusively on the basis of agitation for agrarian reform, and for having largely neglected to mention the bond created by agitation for the antifascist war.

It would seem that the monographs confirm that agitation for dividing up what remained of the large estates after the land reforms of the early 1920s did not start in the ranks of the peasantry, but was largely the work of teams of Communist workers sent out from Bucharest and other larger cities for the purpose. These teams, at best, managed to stir up a small number of landless farm workers.

On the other hand, it does not seem to have been realized that the more "proofs" of the worker-peasant alliance are marshaled, the more irrefutably they prove that Communist agitation had no roots in the great masses of the peasantry. Neither do the instances of teams of Communist workers sent from large industrial centers to support local uprisings against the government authorities in provincial towns in March 1945 argue in favor of the spontaneity of the movement.

Surprisingly, but understandably in this context, the presence in Rumania at the time of the Soviet Army is nowhere mentioned.

STAT

Labor Productivity in Industry

An article (pages 19-33) by S. Zeigher discusses the injunctions issued to industry in the directives of the Second Party Congress, to increase labor productivity sharply during the next 5 years.

The author begins with a short expose of the well-known socialist thesis that, because under a socialist regime, high productivity benefits the laboring masses instead of the capitalists, high productivity should be the prime concern of all workers in industry.

The author asserts that the Communist regime in Rumania is constantly doing its duty to create the necessary conditions for higher labor productivity by granting priority to investments in the industries producing means of production. As a result, he says, those industries were able to provide 60 percent of the equipment, valued at 25 billion lei, supplied to the Rumanian economy under the First Five-Year Plan. Special attention is given to the introduction of advanced technological methods and to the mechanization of operations. Thus, according to the author, in the construction enterprises under the Ministry of Constructions, concrete mixing is now 95 percent mechanized and earth excavation 51 percent, with the result that in 1955 the industry could dispense with 45,000 workers.

Automation, it is claimed, although still in its infancy in Rumania, has been even more successful. Automation of a single furnace at the Hunedoara Combine made it possible to reduce the number of workers servicing this furnace from 960 to 42.

In other factories, productivity was greatly increased by adoption of the latest manufacturing processes. Thus by substituting shaping molds for free shaping of roller bearings, the Orasul Stalin "Steagul Rosu" Plant was able to reduce the time needed to produce a bearing from 30 to 5 minutes.

But, the author warns, the other side of the picture must not be overlooked. A number of plants not only turn out machines which are far inferior to similar machines made abroad, but are actually planning to start manufacturing obsolete models. In the lumber industry, the felling and sawing of trees is only 6 percent mechanized, and loading, 3 percent. Even mechanization of minor operations, which would save a great deal of labor now wasted, is largely neglected. The greater part of the funds available at the State Bank for this purpose was not even used in 1955, Zeigher writes.

The author equally deplores the lack of interest in the improvement of manufacturing techniques shown by the management of many plants, superordinate organs, and trade unions. An advanced technique may be used in one plant, but in a similar plant nearby an antiquated method is still used and no effort made to acquire the know-how from the other plant.

By 1960, the author states, the value of fixed assets available to industry will be three times as great as in 1950, but it is a serious mistake to think, as do a number of the party cadre and certain economists, that new equipment and buildings alone can increase productivity. One of the most important things today, the author emphasizes, is to utilize fully the productive capacity which is already available. The coal mining industry has received a large amount of mechanical equipment since 1951, and is almost entirely mechanized, yet in 1955 productivity was lower instead of higher. At the "23 August" Plant productive capacity was increased 62.5 percent in 1955 over 1952, yet utilized capacity fell 4.5 percent.

STAT

Full utilization of productive capacity, writes Zeigler, demands a skilled labor force, and the regime had planned accordingly. Vocational schools and plant training courses turned out over 850,000 skilled workers in the years 1951-1954. It is true, he admits, that as a result of too rapid expansion, the training was found to have been almost entirely theoretical, but the reforms introduced in January 1955 can be expected to remedy this deficiency.

Another important requirement to which the author draws attention is better organization of the production process and of labor utilization. This includes specialization of plants and full cooperation between them, since specialization is a prerequisite for mass assembly line production and for high quality, -- as exemplified by the progress made by the "Matyas Rakosi" Works, since they began specializing in the manufacture of diesel and semi-diesel engines. The smooth flow of production is impossible unless enterprises supply each other on time with the needed raw materials and parts, which must, of course, be of good quality. This much-needed improvement in the present situation would presumably also remove the incentive to excessive stockpiling of possibly needed supplies by many enterprises. The author recalls that the Second Party Congress severely criticized the State Planning Committee and other state organizations for their faulty planning of the distribution of supplies needed by plants, and he states that the problem has received careful consideration. As a result, one may expect considerable simplification of the system of allocations and the assignment of much greater responsibility to lower echelons for procurement and allocation of supplies.

With regards to personnel problems, the author mentions the imbalance between the administrative apparatus and the actual labor force in the majority of industrial enterprises. He even goes so far as to assert that a radical change in the ratio is, besides a larger output per worker, an essential condition for the victory of the socialist economic system over the capitalist system. But reforms are not needed only in the enterprises themselves. The author mentions the Geological Committee attached to the Council of Ministers, which boasts of a General Directorate of Prospecting, with the sole task of supervising one single enterprise, and the Ministry of Food Industries, which has a special Directorate of Mineral Waters to supervise three enterprises employing 500 people.

The second sore point listed by the author is the extremely important problem of work norms. He claims that instead of being established on the basis of scientific studies, in many enterprises they are set by the management at the level deemed appropriate to provide what it considers a fair wage. In some enterprises, the norms are even set at the end of the month, after, instead of before, the work is done. No wonder that in 1955 the industry average of overfulfillment of norms was 58 percent, and that in some industries the norms were exceeded while labor productivity dropped. Under the circumstances, it is obviously impossible to maintain the correct ratio between increases in productivity and in wages for the ultimate purpose of reducing prices. Further to prove his point, the author gives figures for the last quarter of 1954 and the first quarter of 1955, showing that wage increases accompanied by declines in productivity were regular features of the first quarter of the year in many industries. Those in charge apparently acted on the theory that after the special fourth-quarter effort, the workers deserved a rest and a bonus. Other deplorable phenomena mentioned in the article are absenteeism and excessive labor turnover, especially in the lumber and the building industries.

The author is deeply shocked by these proofs that the working people still fail to comprehend the need for socialist discipline and forget that, by reducing production and increasing costs, they are hurting only themselves, for they are the owners of the enterprises.

STAT

There are still other shortcomings, seriously affecting productivity, on the author's list: He mentions the tendency of management in many enterprises to follow the line of least resistance and to employ the simplest techniques rather than the most productive but more difficult methods, as well as the almost as harmful opposite tendency to introduce all kinds of new techniques without prior testing of their superiority. The author further deplores the tendency of management to be satisfied if the enterprise can boast of one or two star performers among the workers, with no attempt to generalize their achievements. It would be a very good thing, the author thinks, if the "productivity brigades," set up on the initiative of the party organization at the "Petofi Sandor" Factory in Tirgu Mures, were widely copied.

However, the author finds no ground for pessimism in the above list of weaknesses to be overcome by industry if productivity is to reach a satisfactory level, for he can point to solemn pledges given by workers, engineers, and technicians to fight with even greater energy for the successful fulfillment of the Second Five-Year Plan.

From "Party Work Practice"

"How Enterprise Party Organizations Can Make Use of Their Right of Control," by Engr I. Bordas, secretary of the party organization of the "Ernst-Thalmann" Tractor Works in Orasul Stalin, is the first article in this section, a regular feature of Lupta de Clasa, designed to guide party activists through the practical experience of others.

The author begins with a review of the responsibility incumbent, by virtue of the party statute, upon base party organizations of economic enterprises. It consists, in brief, in political responsibility for the fulfillment of the production plan, which implies "competent" checking of the production process, mobilization of all forces to overcome difficulties, and helping in the implementation of managerial decisions by political action among the workers. It is in this spirit, the author claims, that the party committee of the "Ernst Thalmann" works and the 21 subordinate party organizations in its various divisions and services have exercised their right of control. They analyze managerial activity constantly, especially in connection with labor productivity, reduction of production costs, adoption of advanced techniques, etc., for the purpose of helping management to achieve the best results.

Among other concrete examples of the activities of an enterprise party organization, the author describes the method designed to increase productivity which was followed in 1955 by the party committee of which he is secretary. Both the management and a collective drawn from the committee membership were requested to study all the problems involved and to make suitable suggestions. Both reports were carefully studied by the committee, which then submitted its conclusions and draft resolutions to a meeting in which the secretaries of base organizations took part. As a result of their expert knowledge of conditions in each section, it soon became apparent that the main reason which prevented an increase in, and a cheapening of, production was failure to organize a rational sequence of operations to take full advantage of the plant's modern equipment. The most serious deficiency was the improper spacing of "hot" and "cold" operations, which regularly left certain divisions without semifinished products to work on for the first part of every month. Serious deficiencies were also found in the fixing of a number of work norms. The meeting, reports Bordas, allotted concrete tasks aimed at correcting these and other faults to management, to base organizations, and to the Union of Working Youth committee, and set target dates for their fulfillment. In the meantime, political work went into high gear, using every available form of agitation, such as wall

STAT

newspapers, the plant paper, announcements over loud-speakers, and talks by agitators. As a result, in 1955 labor productivity exceeded the planned figure by 10.29 percent, output by 18.3 percent, and the reduction of production costs by 13.62 percent, while wages increased.

Similarly, the base organization of the motor division, according to the author, refused to accept the conclusion reached by the management that 10,000 hours of overtime would be needed if the scheduled number of motors were to be produced. A general meeting of workers was called to discuss the special report on the situation requested from the chief engineer, and as a result, means were found to fulfill the plan without any overtime, simply by improving maintenance and removing bottlenecks.

However, the author warns, party organizations must be very careful not to overstep the limits of their responsibilities. They must never forget that the director of an enterprise is its sole head and the man who is answerable to the state for its entire economic activity. The party organizations have only the right to be informed of the decisions taken by the management, to take up any problems with them, to make recommendations, and, if necessary, to bring important matters to the notice of higher party echelons. What should be aimed at, says Bordas, is a situation in which the management itself is anxious to enlist the help of the party organization, not to get its decisions approved, but because it can count on competent support for them from the best workers in the plant, and on political and moral backing for its tasks.

Judging from the satisfactory results obtained by the Ernst Thälmann Plant under the first Five-Year Plan, the author has full confidence in its ability to attain the annual production goal of 6,000 tractors and 2,000 motors, besides doubling the output of spare parts for agricultural machinery.

In the article, "How We Worked to Strengthen and Develop the Collective Farm," A. Baicu, secretary of the base organization of the Filimon Sirbu collective farm in Calarasi Raion, describes the progress made by this collective farm since its creation in 1950. This progress, according to Baicu, is mainly due to the constant agitation and prodding of the members by the party organization, and to the good example given by them. During the first years, the common fund grew from 185,000 lei to 930,202 lei, the value of a workday from 6.5 to 9 kilograms of grain, besides other produce and cash, and membership from 32 to over 200 families. The author admits, however, that these successes produced a relaxation of efforts to attract other peasants; as a result, only 14 families joined in 1955.

Spurred on by the decision of the Second Party Congress, the base organization of the Filimon Sirbu collective farm, writes its secretary, realized its mistake and immediately started a membership drive. Individual peasants were invited to visit the farm and to attend meetings and artistic shows arranged at the Cultural Home; to each member of the base organization and to each non-party activist were assigned one or two peasant families on whom they were to concentrate their efforts, and to whom they were to explain how the collective farm worked. These base organization members invited the families assigned to them to their homes, to see for themselves how much higher the standards of living of collective farmers were. This is said to have been very effective. At the time of writing, the author states, 30 families had decided to apply for membership, but the party organization is determined not to rest before the remaining 90 families of the village have also been persuaded to join the collective farm voluntarily.

STAT

Other Articles

The space under the heading, "Topical Subjects," is devoted to a critical analysis of party work in MTS (pages 86-94)

In the section, "Answers to Readers" (pages 95-109), a miscellany of questions posed by readers are answered; for instance: "Can agricultural associations be considered as forming part of the socialist sector of agriculture?" "What are credit and savings cooperatives?" and "Must a general assembly of a base party organization have a presidium?"

* * *